setproctitle(3bsd) LOCAL setproctitle(3bsd)
NAME
setproctitle — set process title
LIBRARY
Utility functions from BSD systems (libbsd, -lbsd)
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
(See libbsd(7) for include usage.)
void
setproctitle_init(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[]);
void
setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
DESCRIPTION
The setproctitle() library routine sets the process title that appears on
the ps(1) command.
The setproctitle_init() library routine only needs to be called (before
any call to setproctitle() and with main() arguments), if the automatic
constructor support has not been linked in through the libbsd-ctor pkg-
conf file.
The title is set from the executable's name, followed by the result of a
printf(3) style expansion of the arguments as specified by the fmt argu-
ment. If the fmt argument begins with a “-” character, the executable's
name is skipped.
If fmt is NULL, the process title is restored.
EXAMPLES
To set the title on a daemon to indicate its activity:
setproctitle("talking to %s", inet_ntoa(addr));
SEE ALSO
ps(1), w(1), kvm(3), kvm_getargv(3), printf(3)
STANDARDS
The setproctitle() function is implicitly non-standard. Other methods of
causing the ps(1) command line to change, including copying over the
argv[0] string are also implicitly non-portable. It is preferable to use
an operating system supplied setproctitle() if present.
Unfortunately, it is possible that there are other calling conventions to
other versions of setproctitle(), although none have been found by the
author as yet. This is believed to be the predominant convention.
It is thought that the implementation is compatible with other systems,
including NetBSD and BSD/OS.
HISTORY
The setproctitle() function first appeared in FreeBSD 2.2. Other operat-
ing systems have similar functions.
The setproctitle_init() function is a libbsd extension not present on the
BSDs; avoid using it in portable code.
AUTHORS
Peter Wemm <peter@FreeBSD.org> stole the idea from the Sendmail 8.7.3
source code by Eric Allman <eric@sendmail.org>.
BUGS
Never pass a string with user-supplied data as a format without using
‘%s’. An attacker can put format specifiers in the string to mangle your
stack, leading to a possible security hole. This holds true even if the
string was built using a function like snprintf(), as the resulting
string may still contain user-supplied conversion specifiers for later
interpolation by setproctitle().
Always use the proper secure idiom:
setproctitle("%s", string);
BSD December 16, 1995 BSD
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