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memfd_create(2)               System Calls Manual              memfd_create(2)

NAME
       memfd_create - create an anonymous file

LIBRARY
       Standard C library (libc, -lc)

SYNOPSIS
       #define _GNU_SOURCE         /* See feature_test_macros(7) */
       #include <sys/mman.h>

       int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags);

DESCRIPTION
       memfd_create()  creates an anonymous file and returns a file descriptor
       that refers to it.  The file behaves like a regular file, and so can be
       modified, truncated, memory-mapped, and so on.  However, unlike a regu-
       lar file, it lives in RAM and has a volatile backing storage.  Once all
       references  to  the  file  are  dropped,  it is automatically released.
       Anonymous memory is used for all backing pages of the file.  Therefore,
       files created by memfd_create() have the same semantics as other anony-
       mous memory allocations such as those allocated using mmap(2) with  the
       MAP_ANONYMOUS flag.

       The initial size of the file is set to 0.  Following the call, the file
       size should be set using ftruncate(2).  (Alternatively, the file may be
       populated by calls to write(2) or similar.)

       The  name  supplied in name is used as a filename and will be displayed
       as the target of the  corresponding  symbolic  link  in  the  directory
       /proc/self/fd/.   The displayed name is always prefixed with memfd: and
       serves only for debugging purposes.  Names do not affect  the  behavior
       of  the  file  descriptor, and as such multiple files can have the same
       name without any side effects.

       The following values may be bitwise ORed in flags to change the  behav-
       ior of memfd_create():

       MFD_CLOEXEC
              Set the close-on-exec (FD_CLOEXEC) flag on the new file descrip-
              tor.  See the description of the O_CLOEXEC flag in  open(2)  for
              reasons why this may be useful.

       MFD_ALLOW_SEALING
              Allow  sealing  operations  on this file.  See the discussion of
              the F_ADD_SEALS and F_GET_SEALS operations in fcntl(2), and also
              NOTES,  below.  The initial set of seals is empty.  If this flag
              is not set, the initial set of seals will be F_SEAL_SEAL,  mean-
              ing that no other seals can be set on the file.

       MFD_HUGETLB (since Linux 4.14)
              The  anonymous  file will be created in the hugetlbfs filesystem
              using huge pages.  See the Linux kernel source  file  Documenta-
              tion/admin-guide/mm/hugetlbpage.rst  for  more information about
              hugetlbfs.  Specifying both MFD_HUGETLB and MFD_ALLOW_SEALING in
              flags is supported since Linux 4.16.

       MFD_HUGE_2MB, MFD_HUGE_1GB, ...
              Used  in  conjunction  with  MFD_HUGETLB  to  select alternative
              hugetlb page sizes (respectively, 2 MB, 1 GB, ...)   on  systems
              that support multiple hugetlb page sizes.  Definitions for known
              huge page sizes are included in the header file <linux/memfd.h>.

              For details on encoding huge page  sizes  not  included  in  the
              header file, see the discussion of the similarly named constants
              in mmap(2).

       Unused bits in flags must be 0.

       As its return value, memfd_create() returns a new file descriptor  that
       can  be  used to refer to the file.  This file descriptor is opened for
       both reading and writing (O_RDWR) and O_LARGEFILE is set for  the  file
       descriptor.

       With  respect  to  fork(2) and execve(2), the usual semantics apply for
       the file descriptor created by memfd_create().  A copy of the file  de-
       scriptor  is  inherited  by the child produced by fork(2) and refers to
       the same file.  The file descriptor is preserved across execve(2),  un-
       less the close-on-exec flag has been set.

RETURN VALUE
       On success, memfd_create() returns a new file descriptor.  On error, -1
       is returned and errno is set to indicate the error.

ERRORS
       EFAULT The address in name points to invalid memory.

       EINVAL flags included unknown bits.

       EINVAL name was too long.  (The limit is 249 bytes, excluding the  ter-
              minating null byte.)

       EINVAL Both MFD_HUGETLB and MFD_ALLOW_SEALING were specified in flags.

       EMFILE The per-process limit on the number of open file descriptors has
              been reached.

       ENFILE The system-wide limit on the total number of open files has been
              reached.

       ENOMEM There was insufficient memory to create a new anonymous file.

VERSIONS
       The memfd_create() system call first appeared in Linux 3.17; glibc sup-
       port was added in glibc 2.27.

       EPERM  The MFD_HUGETLB flag was specified, but the caller was not priv-
              ileged  (did  not have the CAP_IPC_LOCK capability) and is not a
              member of the sysctl_hugetlb_shm_group group; see  the  descrip-
              tion of /proc/sys/vm/sysctl_hugetlb_shm_group in proc(5).

STANDARDS
       The memfd_create() system call is Linux-specific.

NOTES
       The  memfd_create()  system call provides a simple alternative to manu-
       ally mounting a tmpfs(5) filesystem and creating and opening a file  in
       that  filesystem.   The  primary purpose of memfd_create() is to create
       files and associated file descriptors that are used with the file-seal-
       ing APIs provided by fcntl(2).

       The  memfd_create()  system  call  also  has  uses without file sealing
       (which is why file-sealing is  disabled,  unless  explicitly  requested
       with  the MFD_ALLOW_SEALING flag).  In particular, it can be used as an
       alternative to creating files in tmp or as an alternative to using  the
       open(2) O_TMPFILE in cases where there is no intention to actually link
       the resulting file into the filesystem.

   File sealing
       In the absence of file sealing, processes that communicate  via  shared
       memory  must either trust each other, or take measures to deal with the
       possibility that an untrusted peer may manipulate the shared memory re-
       gion  in problematic ways.  For example, an untrusted peer might modify
       the contents of the shared memory at any time,  or  shrink  the  shared
       memory region.  The former possibility leaves the local process vulner-
       able to time-of-check-to-time-of-use race conditions  (typically  dealt
       with  by copying data from the shared memory region before checking and
       using it).  The latter possibility leaves the local process  vulnerable
       to  SIGBUS  signals when an attempt is made to access a now-nonexistent
       location in the shared memory region.  (Dealing with  this  possibility
       necessitates the use of a handler for the SIGBUS signal.)

       Dealing  with untrusted peers imposes extra complexity on code that em-
       ploys shared memory.  Memory sealing enables that extra  complexity  to
       be eliminated, by allowing a process to operate secure in the knowledge
       that its peer can't modify the shared memory in an undesired fashion.

       An example of the usage of the sealing mechanism is as follows:

       (1)  The first process creates a tmpfs(5)  file  using  memfd_create().
            The call yields a file descriptor used in subsequent steps.

       (2)  The  first process sizes the file created in the previous step us-
            ing ftruncate(2), maps it using mmap(2), and populates the  shared
            memory with the desired data.

       (3)  The first process uses the fcntl(2) F_ADD_SEALS operation to place
            one or more seals on the file, in order to restrict further  modi-
            fications on the file.  (If placing the seal F_SEAL_WRITE, then it
            will be necessary to first unmap the shared writable mapping  cre-
            ated  in  the  previous  step.   Otherwise,  behavior  similar  to
            F_SEAL_WRITE can be achieved by using  F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE,  which
            will  prevent future writes via mmap(2) and write(2) from succeed-
            ing while keeping existing shared writable mappings).

       (4)  A second process obtains a file descriptor for the  tmpfs(5)  file
            and  maps  it.  Among the possible ways in which this could happen
            are the following:

            •  The process that called memfd_create() could transfer  the  re-
               sulting file descriptor to the second process via a UNIX domain
               socket (see unix(7) and cmsg(3)).  The second process then maps
               the file using mmap(2).

            •  The  second  process  is created via fork(2) and thus automati-
               cally inherits the file descriptor and mapping.  (Note that  in
               this  case  and the next, there is a natural trust relationship
               between the two processes, since they  are  running  under  the
               same  user  ID.   Therefore, file sealing would not normally be
               necessary.)

            •  The second process opens the  file  /proc/<pid>/fd/<fd>,  where
               <pid>  is  the  PID  of  the first process (the one that called
               memfd_create()), and <fd> is the number of the file  descriptor
               returned  by  the  call to memfd_create() in that process.  The
               second process then maps the file using mmap(2).

       (5)  The second process uses the fcntl(2) F_GET_SEALS operation to  re-
            trieve  the  bit  mask of seals that has been applied to the file.
            This bit mask can be inspected in order to determine what kinds of
            restrictions  have been placed on file modifications.  If desired,
            the second process can apply further seals  to  impose  additional
            restrictions (so long as the F_SEAL_SEAL seal has not yet been ap-
            plied).

EXAMPLES
       Below are shown two  example  programs  that  demonstrate  the  use  of
       memfd_create() and the file sealing API.

       The  first  program,  t_memfd_create.c,  creates  a tmpfs(5) file using
       memfd_create(), sets a size for the file, maps it into memory, and  op-
       tionally  places  some  seals  on  the file.  The program accepts up to
       three command-line arguments, of which the first two are required.  The
       first argument is the name to associate with the file, the second argu-
       ment is the size to be set for the file, and the optional  third  argu-
       ment  is  a  string  of  characters that specify seals to be set on the
       file.

       The second program, t_get_seals.c, can be used to open an existing file
       that  was  created via memfd_create() and inspect the set of seals that
       have been applied to that file.

       The following shell session demonstrates the  use  of  these  programs.
       First we create a tmpfs(5) file and set some seals on it:

           $ ./t_memfd_create my_memfd_file 4096 sw &
           [1] 11775
           PID: 11775; fd: 3; /proc/11775/fd/3

       At this point, the t_memfd_create program continues to run in the back-
       ground.  From another program, we can obtain a file descriptor for  the
       file  created  by  memfd_create() by opening the /proc/pid/fd file that
       corresponds to the file descriptor  opened  by  memfd_create().   Using
       that  pathname,  we  inspect  the  content of the /proc/pid/fd symbolic
       link, and use our t_get_seals program to view the seals that have  been
       placed on the file:

           $ readlink /proc/11775/fd/3
           /memfd:my_memfd_file (deleted)
           $ ./t_get_seals /proc/11775/fd/3
           Existing seals: WRITE SHRINK

   Program source: t_memfd_create.c

       #define _GNU_SOURCE
       #include <err.h>
       #include <fcntl.h>
       #include <stdint.h>
       #include <stdio.h>
       #include <stdlib.h>
       #include <string.h>
       #include <sys/mman.h>
       #include <unistd.h>

       int
       main(int argc, char *argv[])
       {
           int           fd;
           char          *name, *seals_arg;
           ssize_t       len;
           unsigned int  seals;

           if (argc < 3) {
               fprintf(stderr, "%s name size [seals]\n", argv[0]);
               fprintf(stderr, "\t'seals' can contain any of the "
                       "following characters:\n");
               fprintf(stderr, "\t\tg - F_SEAL_GROW\n");
               fprintf(stderr, "\t\ts - F_SEAL_SHRINK\n");
               fprintf(stderr, "\t\tw - F_SEAL_WRITE\n");
               fprintf(stderr, "\t\tW - F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE\n");
               fprintf(stderr, "\t\tS - F_SEAL_SEAL\n");
               exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
           }

           name = argv[1];
           len = atoi(argv[2]);
           seals_arg = argv[3];

           /* Create an anonymous file in tmpfs; allow seals to be
              placed on the file. */

           fd = memfd_create(name, MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
           if (fd == -1)
               err(EXIT_FAILURE, "memfd_create");

           /* Size the file as specified on the command line. */

           if (ftruncate(fd, len) == -1)
               err(EXIT_FAILURE, "truncate");

           printf("PID: %jd; fd: %d; /proc/%jd/fd/%d\n",
                  (intmax_t) getpid(), fd, (intmax_t) getpid(), fd);

           /* Code to map the file and populate the mapping with data
              omitted. */

           /* If a 'seals' command-line argument was supplied, set some
              seals on the file. */

           if (seals_arg != NULL) {
               seals = 0;

               if (strchr(seals_arg, 'g') != NULL)
                   seals |= F_SEAL_GROW;
               if (strchr(seals_arg, 's') != NULL)
                   seals |= F_SEAL_SHRINK;
               if (strchr(seals_arg, 'w') != NULL)
                   seals |= F_SEAL_WRITE;
               if (strchr(seals_arg, 'W') != NULL)
                   seals |= F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE;
               if (strchr(seals_arg, 'S') != NULL)
                   seals |= F_SEAL_SEAL;

               if (fcntl(fd, F_ADD_SEALS, seals) == -1)
                   err(EXIT_FAILURE, "fcntl");
           }

           /* Keep running, so that the file created by memfd_create()
              continues to exist. */

           pause();

           exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
       }

   Program source: t_get_seals.c

       #define _GNU_SOURCE
       #include <err.h>
       #include <fcntl.h>
       #include <stdio.h>
       #include <stdlib.h>

       int
       main(int argc, char *argv[])
       {
           int           fd;
           unsigned int  seals;

           if (argc != 2) {
               fprintf(stderr, "%s /proc/PID/fd/FD\n", argv[0]);
               exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
           }

           fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR);
           if (fd == -1)
               err(EXIT_FAILURE, "open");

           seals = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
           if (seals == -1)
               err(EXIT_FAILURE, "fcntl");

           printf("Existing seals:");
           if (seals & F_SEAL_SEAL)
               printf(" SEAL");
           if (seals & F_SEAL_GROW)
               printf(" GROW");
           if (seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)
               printf(" WRITE");
           if (seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)
               printf(" FUTURE_WRITE");
           if (seals & F_SEAL_SHRINK)
               printf(" SHRINK");
           printf("\n");

           /* Code to map the file and access the contents of the
              resulting mapping omitted. */

           exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
       }

SEE ALSO
       fcntl(2),    ftruncate(2),    memfd_secret(2),    mmap(2),   shmget(2),
       shm_open(3)

Linux man-pages 6.03              2023-02-05                   memfd_create(2)

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